Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile must be jesting when he said that I anchored my arguments on the unconstitutionality of a “legislative constituent assembly” on the 1935 Constitution.

 

         Certainly, I was looking at the 1987 Constitution, and not at the 76-year old Charter.

 

         It is Enrile who is looking at the 1935 Constitution when he agreed to the proposal for a separate voting of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives despite the obvious absence of this provision in the 1987 Constitution.

 

         It should be Enrile who should reread the 1987 provisions and comprehend the grant of power to propose constitutional amendments to the Congress as a constituent assembly in the light of the leading and prevailing case of Gonzales vs. COMELEC wherein the Supreme Court categorically distinguished legislative authority from constituent power.

 

         The Supreme Court ruled in 1967 that “Indeed, the power to amend the constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress x x x hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representative act, not as Members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.”

 

         Section I(1), Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; x x x”

 

         This empowers Representatives and Senators to jointly convene in a constituent assembly to consider and propose charter change, not as legislators representing their respective Chambers but as “component elements of a constituent assembly” in the precise language of the Supreme Court.

 

         Moreover, the 1987 Constitution requires “a vote of three-fourths of all the Members.” The clear import of this provision consists of: (1) the convening of a joint assembly or session wherein the requisite vote of all members could be determined; and (2) no “separate voting” of the House of Representatives and the Senate is authorized because there is no Chamber or institutional representation in the constituent assembly.

 

         The infirm variation of the constituent assembly endorsed by Enrile does not only propose using the legislative format as basis of the proceedings but authorizes separate voting of each House, both of which do not find anchorage in the 1987 Constitution.

 

         If there is any relevance of the 1935 Constitution to the current debate, it is on the fact that (1) it confirmed that in a constitutional assembly, the Congress must convene in joint session; and (2) in contrast, it called specifically for a separate voting of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, while the 1987 Constitution does not.