Contact Details

Rm. N-411, House of Representatives, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines
+63 2 931 5497, +63 2 931 5001 local 7370
Office of Minority Leader
EDCEL C. LAGMAN
0916-6406737 / 0918-9120137
08 November 2011
 
 
            It would take only one Justice who voted with the majority to reconsider his vote in order to reverse the close 8-7 decision of the Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the controversial R.A. No. 10153 which cancelled the 08 August 2011 ARMM elections and authorized the President to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs).
 
            House Minority Leader and Albay Representative Edcel C. Lagman, the lead petitioner assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10153, tries to achieve this reversal when he filed today, 08 November 2011, an 85-page Motion for Reconsideration maintaining the nullity of the challenged statute.
 
            The following grounds were raised by Lagman in seeking a reconsideration:
 
           (1) The unequivocal constitutional mandate for elective and representative ARMM executive department and legislative assembly indubitably precludes the President’s appointment of officers-in-charge (OICs) for ARMM elective positions;
 
            (2) The President’s power of appointment is limited to purely appointed officials and his power of supervision over ARMM officials does not include the appointment of elective officials which is an exercise of control not vested in the President;
 
            (3) The Constitution does not prohibit the holdover of ARMM elective and regional officials pending the election and qualification of their successors as expressly provided in the expanded Organic Acts which fixed the terms of office of the ARMM regional governor, vice governor and members of the regional assembly.
 
            (4) The prerequisites of supermajority of 2/3 votes in both houses of Congress and a plebiscite for the validity and effectivity of substantial amendments to or revision of the Organic Acts do not offend the Constitution and in fact they comply with the constitutional mandate guaranteeing autonomy in ARMM and foreclosing inimical and whimsical amendments which derogate autonomy.
 
            (5) The requirements of supermajority and plebiscite have been previously approved by the ARMM electorate in plebiscites called for the purpose, and any disregard or reversal of such safeguards must have the assent or approval of the people in ARMM through another plebiscite.
 
            (6) R.A.  No. 10153 introduced substantial and fundamental amendments  to the Organic Acts which suppress the electoral will and dilute autonomy so much so that the safeguards on supermajority and plebiscite must be strictly complied with, which mandatory requirements were brushed aside by the Congress in the enactment of the controversial statute; and
 
            (7) The holding by the COMELEC of special elections in ARMM is within its legislated authority and the only legal and expeditious measure of upholding the electoral will and protecting the autonomy in ARMM which were both transgressed by R.A. No. 10153.
 
            An “appointive” OIC is clearly not elective and can never be representative. The mandate of the appointee OIC does not come from the electorate but is bestowed by the appointing power, who in this case is the President.
 
            The OICs are not going to serve for a short duration. They will discharge the powers and functions of the elective and representative principal officials of ARMM for almost two years or two-thirds of the terms of elective and representative officials.
 
The installation of OICs is a wanton aberration of autonomy since OICs are beholden to the President, accountable to the President and removable by the President, with nary the participation of the people in the constituent political units.
 
            The subservience of appointive officials to the appointing authority is compounded by the Filipino custom of “utang na loob”.
 
            Any frailty in ARMM’s electoral process cannot be solved by OIC appointments. This “cure”, which tramples on elections and autonomy, is even worse than the malady it is supposed to remedy.       
 
The holdover provision serves to preserve the electoral mandate. It is better to allow these elected officials to continue serving their constituents by extending their tenures, not their terms, until their successors have been elected and qualified than resort to appointment which is clearly not representative and does not vest the electoral mandate on the appointed officials. Sections 3-5 of RA 10153 blatantly disregard the significance of the elective and representative nature of the positions of Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and offices of the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of ARMM.
 
            The concept of supermajority is not an invention of R.A. 9054. This requirement can be found in various constitutional provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
 
            The requirement of a supermajority of 2/3 vote of all Members to (a) expel or suppress a Member; (b) declare a state of war; (c) override a Presidential veto; (d) determine the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office; (e) Senate’s ratification of a treaty or international agreement; (f) Senate’s judgment of conviction in impeachment cases; (g) congressional call for the holding of a Constitutional Convention; and (h) ¾ votes for proposed amendment or revision of the Constitution by a Constituent Assembly, does not make the exercise of the foregoing powers impossible to achieve. Verily, the Constitution does not impose impossible requirements. By parity of reasoning, the 2/3 supermajority to amend or revise the Organic Acts does not make the Organic Acts irrepealable.
 
The supermajority only serves as a stringent but achievable requirement to effect changes in the Organic Act because it is meant as a self-limitation on the plenary power of Congress to ensure that the autonomy of ARMM is preserved. In effect, it makes sure that Congress does not unduly interfere in the affairs of ARMM and violate its autonomy with legislation which might not be for the best interest of ARMM. It is a faithful observance of the autonomy which the Constitution guarantees for autonomous regions.
 
      If it is alleged that the electoral process in ARMM is problematic, then it would be better that the ARMM elections be held separately in order that full concentration of all relevant agencies can be focused on the ARMM elections to assure peaceful, orderly, honest and clean elections, rather than immerse the ARMM elections with the rough and tumble of synchronized elections.